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Notes
RHODE ISLAND'S 407 SUBSEQUENT
REMEDIAL MEASURE EXCEPTION:
WHY IT INFORMS WHAT GOES
AROUND COMES AROUND IN
RESTATEMENTS (SECOND) &
(THIRD) OF TORTS, AND A MODEST
PROPOSAL
For, dear me, why abandon a belief
Merely because it ceases to be true.
Cling to it long enough, and not a doubt
It will turn true again, for so it goes.
Most of the change we think we see in life
Is due to truths being in and out of favour
As I sit here, and oftentimes, I wish
I could be monarch of a desert land
I could devote and dedicate forever
To the truths we keep coming back and back to.1
1. Excerpted from The Black Cottage, ROBERT FROST, EARLY FROST 77
(Jeffrey Meyers ed., The Ecco Press 1996).
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WHAT GOES AROUND COMES AROUND
PART I - RHODE ISLAND 407: CURIOSITY OR SIGNIFICANT SYMBOL?
A. Introduction
Rhode Island Rule of Evidence 407 states: "When, after an
event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would have
made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent
measures is admissible."2 This subsequent remedial measure rule
stands in direct contrast to its federal counterpart, 3 as well as
each of Rhode Island's forty-nine sister states.4 Upon its surface,
to stand in such a singular minority might initially seem
anachronistic. But upon reflection, Rhode Island's contrary 407
rule begs an inquiry - be it the product of design and intention or
mere circumstance, might Rhode Island 407 stand for something
more? Specifically, in exploring Rhode Island Rule of Evidence
407, this note seeks to understand and advocate whether Rhode
Island would be prudent to join the dominant, near-unanimous
consensus banning evidence of subsequent remedial measures in
negligence cases or whether Rhode Island's unique position might
in fact signify a de facto leadership position. At the least, the
Rhode Island rule can be seen as less of an anachronism when
used as a foil to the sought after evolution of a national
understanding of deep policy principles implicated in tort
liability. 5
B. Subsequent Remedial Measure - 50 State Survey
Federal Rule 407 makes inadmissible subsequent remedial
2. R.I. R. EVID. 407.
3. FED. R. EVID. 407 ("When, after an injury or harm allegedly caused by
an event, measures are taken that, if taken previously, would have made the
injury or harm less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is
not admissible to prove negligence, culpable conduct, a defect in a product, a
defect in a product's design, or a need for a warning or instruction.").
4. See infra notes 8-13 and accompanying text.
5. Marcie J. Freeman, Comment, Spanning the Spectrum: Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rule of Evidence 407, 28 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1175,
1186 (1997); in a conclusion that sets the stage for the current comment, the
author writes, "Federal Rule of Evidence 407 existed in evidentiary common
law for hundreds of years. Only recently has the rule become a source of
debate and a target of reform, which has been fueled by the development of
strict liability as a cause of action and American dissatisfaction with tort
law." Id. at 1218.
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measure evidence in general negligence cases as well as in cases of
strict liability for product defect, design, and failure to warn. 6 The
evidentiary exclusion in the realm of product liabilities claims was
added in a 1997 amendment. 7 Though suggestive, the Federal
Rules of Evidence have no binding power over the states.
Twelve jurisdictions have in place a rule equivalent or nearly
equivalent to the federal position which does not allow such
evidence in either negligence or product liability claims. These
jurisdictions are Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Kentucky, Minnesota,
Montana, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah,
Vermont, and Guam. 8 Thirty-four states do not allow such
evidence in negligence claims but have not established an
evidentiary rule to directly address the product liability question.
These are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado,
Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and
Wyoming. 9  Also among this group is California, although
California is unique in that it provides no exceptions to the rule
when the evidence is offered for another enumerated purpose. 10
6. FED. R. EVID. 407.
7. FED. R. EVID. 407 (amended April 11, 1997, effective Dec. 1, 1997).
8. DEL. R. EVID. 407; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.407 (West 2009); IDAHO R.
EVID. 407; Ky. R. EVID. 407; MINN. R. EVID. 407; MoNT. R. EVID. 407; N.D. R.
EVID. 407; PA. R. EVID. 407; TENN. R. EVID. 407; UTAH R. EVID. 407; VT. R.
EVID. 407; GuAM R. EVID. 407.
9. ALA. R. EVID. 407; ALASKA R. EVID. 407; ARIz. R. EVID. 407; ARK. R.
EVID. 407; COLO. R. EVID. 407; 4 JOHN J. DVORSKE, GEORGIA PROCEDURE § 4:31
(2008); HAW. R. EVID. 407; 18 CHRISTINE GIMENO ET. AL., ILLINOIS LAW AND
PRACTICE § 146 (2008); IND. R. EVID. 407; IOWA R. EVID. 5.407; KAN. R. EVID.
60-451; LA. R. EVID. 407; MD. R. EVID. 5-407; 14B HOWARD J. ALPERIN,
MASSACHUSETTS PRACTICE SERIES § 10.71 (4th ed. 2007); MICH. R. EvID. 407;
MIss. R. EVID. 407; NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-407 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
48.095 (LexisNexis 2006); N.H. R. EVID. 407; N.J. R. EVID. 407; N.M. R. EVID.
407; 79 N.Y. JUR. 2D Negligence § 170 (2009); N.C. R. EVID. 407; OHIO R. EVID.
407; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2407 (West 1993); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §
40.185 (West 1988); S.C. R. EVID. 407; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 19-12-9 (2008);
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-418.1 (LexisNexis 2007); WASH. R. EVID. 407; W. VA. R.
EViD. 407; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 904.07 (West 2000); WYO. R. EVID. 407.
10. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1151 (Deering 2008); see also FED. R. EVID. 407
(standard enumerated exception purposes include proving ownership, control,
feasibility of precautionary measures, or impeachment).
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Two states do not allow subsequent remedial evidence for
negligence but explicitly permit such evidence to be used in strict
liability claims; these are Connecticut and Missouri. 11 Two states,
Maine and Texas, mirror the federal rule but have added an
express exception allowing evidence of 'Notification of Defect' as
admissible to support a product liability claim. 12 Only one state
permits evidence of remedial measures under all circumstances -
Rhode Island. 13
C. The 'Modern' Maine Repair Rule and Rhode Island's Reliance
In 1987 Rhode Island adopted the evidentiary rule that made
all subsequent remedial evidence admissible. 14 Prior to adoption,
in the Rhode Island Advisory Committee Notes to proposed rule
407, the advisory committee expressed clear cognizance that the
proposed rule was a departure from FRE 407 as well as then
current Rhode Island law. 15  In support of this proposed
departure, the committee explained: "The proposed rule is
consistent with the modern trend and the central notion of
relevancy in the rules and is based on a more realistic assessment
of the policy considerations underlying the current approach. The
proposed Rhode Island rule is based on Maine Rule of Evidence
407(a)."'16 Alluding to "signs of a departure from the traditional
approach" to bar evidence of remedial measures 17, the Advisory
Committee continued building the case for divergence from the
federal rule as well as Rhode Island common law by pointing to
Maine's lead. 18 Slightly more than decade earlier, in 1975,
11. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-7 (West 2008); 22 WILLIAM A. SCHROEDER,
MISSOURI PRACTICE SERIES § 407.1 (2008); 22 JEFFREY A. BURNS, MISSOURI
PRACTICE SERIES § 13.8 (2008).
12. ME. R. EVID. 407; TEX. R. EVID. 407.
13. R.I. R. EVID. 407.
14. R.I. R. EVID. 407 (adopted July 20, 1987, effective Oct. 1, 1987).
15. R.I. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note; The committee quoted
Morancy v. Hennessey, 52 A. 1021, 1023 (R.I. 1902) (In Morancy, the Rhode
Island high court set forth the rule regarding subsequent remedial measures
holding that "evidence of precautions against further accidents, taken after
an accident, is not competent to show antecedent negligence.").
16. R.I. R. EVID. 407, Advisory Committee's Note.
17. Id.
18. Id. (The Rhode Island Advisory Committee quoted Maine's
precedential 407(a) Evidence Code: "When after an event, measures are
taken which, if taken previously, would have made the event less likely to
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Maine's Supreme Judicial Court had promulgated the Maine
Rules of Evidence. 19 In so doing, Maine became the first and only
American jurisdiction admitting evidence of subsequent remedial
repairs as circumstantial evidence of negligence. 20 Apparently,
Maine's decision made a strong impression upon the Rhode Island
Advisory Committee which noted that the Maine rule directly
contravened Maine law, just as proposed rule 407, if adopted,
would contravene Rhode Island law.21 Though the capacity to
refer to a trend-setting state helped the Rhode Island Advisory
Committee support its proposed change, it was the policy
consideration being advanced in Maine that functioned as the core
of the proposed rule change here in Rhode Island. The Advisory
Committee of Rhode Island quoted with apparent favor the
Advisory Note to Maine's Rule of Evidence 407(a), which asserted,
"public policy behind the rule against admissibility was that it
would deter repairs. This rationale is unpersuasive today."22
Ultimately, Rhode Island adopted the proposed rule of the
Advisory Committee on July 23, 1987.23 The Rhode Island 407
Rule mirrored the Maine Rule but for a single, non-significant
difference. 24 Thus, for several years Rhode Island and Maine
shared the minority distinction of being the only jurisdictions
allowing evidence of subsequent remedies to demonstrate the
nature of antecedent behavior.
This simpatico did not last. On July 15, 1995, an amendment
to Maine's 407 Rule was made effective. 25 Maine rule 407(a) now
holds in pertinent part:
When, after an injury or harm allegedly caused by an
event, measures are taken that, if taken previously,
occur, evidence of subsequent measures is admissible.").
19. ME. R. EVID. 407 (adopted May 13, 1975, effective Feb. 2, 1976).
20. Comment, The Repair Rule: Maine Rule of Evidence 407(a) and the
Admissibility of Subsequent Remedial Measures in Proving Negligence, 27
ME. L. REV. 225, 226 (1975) (hereinafter The Repair Rule).
21. R.I. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note.
22. R.I. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note (quoting ME. R. EVID. 407
adviser's note).
23. R.I. R. EVID. 407 supra note 14.
24. Rhode Island 407 added the article 'the' before the phrase
'subsequent measures.' In all other details, the Rhode Island and 1976 Maine
rule are perfect reflections.
25. ME. R. EvID. 407.
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would have made the injury or harm less likely to occur,
evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to
prove negligence, culpable conduct, a defect in a product,
a defect in a product's design, or a need for a warning or
instruction. 26
Since Maine's decision to align with the federal subsequent
remedial measure rule, Rhode Island has stood as the solitary
jurisdiction allowing subsequent remedial measures to prove
antecedent conduct, negligent or other. Thus, before deciding
whether Rhode Island should have followed Maine's lead, this note
will address whether Maine correctly decided, in the first
instance, to allow subsequent remedial measure evidence. 27
D. Rhode Island Out on a Limb - Reliance Beyond Maine
Rhode Island's reliance on the "modern trend" evidenced by
the 1975 Maine approach may have helped to put Rhode Island in
its curious minority position in relation to subsequent remedial
measures, but there is more to this story than Maine's turnabout.
In fact, it is the correlation of 407 rules to product liability
lawsuits that underlies any discussion of the propriety or
impropriety of the admissibility of subsequent remedial
measures. 28 Rhode Island's Advisory Committee made critical
note of the essential issue in the final paragraph of their proposed
407 rule, and in doing so adumbrated a major controversy in tort
law. 29 Tensions between negligence principles and strict liability
26. Id.
27. Compare Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of
Judging in Hindsight, 65 CHI. L. REV. 571, 617-18 (1998) ("The liberal rules of
relevance in contemporary evidence law, however, probably support
admitting evidence that a defendant has taken subsequent remedial
measures. Defendants should, in principle, have no fear of this evidence.").
28. Roger C. Henderson, Product Liability and Admissibility of
Subsequent Remedial Measures: Resolving The Conflict By Recognizing the
Difference Between Negligence and Strict Tort Liability, 64 NEB. L. REV. 1, 5
(1985).
29. The Advisory Committee noted: "Recent developments in the law of
products liability have caused some jurisdictions to interpret the rule
generally excluding evidence of subsequent remedial measures as
inapplicable in cases where such evidence is offered to prove the existence of
a defect in a strict liability case. The rationale for this exception is that the
evidence is not being offered to show 'negligence.' The leading case is Ault v.
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principles in product design, defect and warning suits are
themselves abundant. 30 As the advisory committee pointed out:
The confusion in this area stems from the language in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965), that 'one
who sells any product in a defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user . . . is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused. . .' This
language seems to emphasize fault and thus call[s] into
play the concerns of FRE 407. Neither the text nor the
legislative history of the federal rule confronts this
problem. No Rhode Island authority was found on this
point. Given the current state of tort law, it is logically
indefensible to distinguish between strict liability and
negligence cases in applying this rule.31
Tensions between negligence and strict liability principles
and Rule 407 have been complicated by the 1997 amendment to
the Federal Rules of Evidence which was, ironically, altered to
alleviate apparent tensions. 32 The amendment clarified Federal
Rule 407 to include that "evidence of subsequent measures is not
admissible to prove negligence, culpable conduct, a defect in a
product, a defect in the product's design, or a need for a warning
or instruction." 33  Apparently, this amendment resolved the
conflict between negligence and strict liability principles for the
International Harvester Co.." R.I. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note.
Thus, the Advisory Committee was fully aware that the rule they were
creating for negligence cases would become fully applicable to the more
modern cases involving product defect.
30. Henderson, supra note 28, at 8-11. For a thorough review of the
seminal framework case law which, though relevant, is outside the scope of
the current note, see Henderson, supra note 28, at 16-20.
31. R.I. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note (emphasis added); see also
Wendy Bugher Greenley, Note, Federal Rule of Evidence 407: New
Controversy Besets the Admissibility of Subsequent Remedial Measures, 30
VILL. L. REV. 1611, 1622 (1985) (providing further analysis of the proposition
that "no principled basis exists to distinguish negligence and strict liability
actions with respect to the admissibility of evidence of subsequent remedial
measures.").
32. FED. R. EVID. 407 (amended Apr. 11, 1997, effective Dec. 1, 1997).
33. As is the case in many jurisdictions, the rule provides exceptions in
its second sentence, which asserts: "This rule does not require the exclusion
of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such
as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if
controverted, or impeachment." Id.
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purposes of Rule 407 by eliminating the distinction between the
two. The practical effect of the change is that evidence of
subsequent remedial measures, intended to prove either
negligence or strict liability claims, will be treated the same - both
will be barred. This amendment accords with the Rhode Island
Advisory Committee's position, articulated a decade earlier, that
given the language of the legal standards applied it is logically
indefensible to treat negligence claims differently from strict
liability claims in determining whether to allow or bar subsequent
remedial measure evidence. 34 Thus, even as Maine was changing
its rule to strike a uniform pose with its federal counterpart, and
even as the federal rule was changing to address the confused
state of application of 407 in relation to negligence and strict
liability actions, one of the core principles underlying Rhode
Island's unchanged 407 approach, a de facto rejection of the
federal evidentiary bar - that the standard of admissibility is the
same regardless of whether the case is one sounding in negligence
or one sounding in products liability - was concurrently, if
unintentionally, being affirmed. 35
However, just as one hand giveth and another taketh away, in
near concurrence with the federal clarification, the American Law
Institute was publishing Restatement (Third) of Torts (1997).36
Restatement (Third) advocated a significant overhaul in relation
to proving product liability claims. 37 This overhaul dramatically
implicated Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965)38, the
very section cited by the Rhode Island Advisory Committee that
"thus call into play the concerns of FRE 407.''39 Adopted by many
state courts since its 1997 introduction, the Restatement (Third)
34. R.I. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note; see also R.I. R. EVID. 407
advisory committee's note supra note 31 and accompanying text.
35. Not yet addressed in this note is the simple proposition that Rule 407
is unnecessary, a simple proposition adhered to in the final line of the Rhode
Island Advisory Committee's note - "In the rare case where it would be
unfair or misleading to admit evidence of subsequent remedial measures,
Rule 403 gives the trial judge discretion to exclude it." R.I. R. EVID. 407
advisory committee's note.
36. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS (1997).
37. Frank J. Vandall, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability, Section 2(b): The Reasonable Alternative Design Requirement, 61
TENN. L. REV. 1407, 1407 (1994).
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965).
39. R.I. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note.
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proposes a Reasonable Alternative Design (hereinafter "RAD ''40 )
requirement in product liability cases. 41  And in fact, "[t]he
majority of American courts either explicitly or implicitly require
the plaintiff to prove the availability of a feasible alternative
design in design defect cases. ''42  Adherence to a feasible
alternative design requirement and a 407 bar to subsequent
remedial measures reveals direct conflict. 43  Exposed is a
contradiction that requires discarding of either the feasible
alternative design requirement or the rule 407 evidentiary bar. 44
While such a contradiction may be finessed by courts, consistency
of approach will promote predictability of outcome.
Thus, while Rhode Island may be out on a limb in allowing
evidence of subsequent remedial measures despite its position in
relation to a dominant majority, it may just be that it is not the
limb but the tree that is falling. As a result, other jurisdictions
will be forced to confront the logical impossibility of sustaining the
exclusionary bar to subsequent remedial measures while
embracing the modern trend toward requiring plaintiffs to present
evidence of a feasible alternative design.
40. It should be noted that courts and commentators alike frequently
apply the term "feasible alternative design" as synonymous with "reasonable
alternative design." This synonymous usage implicates the simple
underlying concept that a design can only be accepted as having been a
"reasonable alternative" if the design was, in fact, a "feasible alternative" at
the time of the incident giving rise to the alleged tort. Excepting for products
with zero utilitarian value, to hold, for example, a manufacturer liable under
negligence or strict liability for not producing and delivering into the stream
of commerce a product that would be impossible to produce and deliver would
itself be the quintessence of unreasonableness.
41. Laura B. Grubbs, Note, Something's Gotta Give: The Conflict Between
Evidence Rule 407 and the Feasible Alternative Design Requirement, 45
BRANDEIS L.J. 781, 784 (2007).
42. Id. at 802 (citing to RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. §
2(b) cmt. d, (1997).
43. Grubbs, supra note 41, at 784.
44. Id. at 806 (illustrating the contradiction through Rahmig v. Mosley
Machinery Co., a Nebraska decision in which the court held that the
admission of a subsequent remedial measure barred under Nebraska Rule
407 was not erroneous because prior case law requiring a feasible alternative
design made such evidence necessary; the court resolved the conflict by
eventually overruling the feasible alternative design requirement).
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PART II - RHODE ISLAND 407 As SIGNIFICANT SYMBOL
A. The World Gets Wiser
Having come this far, it is appropriate to identify the twin
foundations upon which federal rule 407 rests. The first is rooted
in the seminal declaration of Baron Bramwell who, in Hart v.
Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry. Co., rejected the dubious proposition
that, "[B]ecause the world gets wiser as it gets older, therefore it
was foolish before."' 45 Aligning with Baron Bramwell, federal rule
407 advances the notion that evidence of subsequent remedies is
of such limited probative value that its evidentiary value does not
justify admission when weighed alongside the second justification
for its exclusion. The original Advisory Committee Notes to the
Federal Rules states:
The rule rests on two grounds. (1) The conduct is not in fact
an admission, since the conduct is equally consistent with injury
by mere accident or through contributory negligence .... Under a
liberal theory of relevancy this ground alone would not support
exclusion as the inference is still a possible one. (2) The other, and
more impressive, ground for exclusion rests on a social policy of
encouraging people to take, or at least not discouraging them from
taking, steps in furtherance of added safety.46
Thus, the clear meaning is that absent a social policy
implication, the evidentiary value of a subsequent remedial
measure is sufficient to permit its evidentiary inclusion even if the
probative value is limited. 47 Absent a social policy consideration
or exclusion under a 403 analysis48 , the determination of value in
45. FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note (quoting Hart v.
Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry. Co., 21 L.T. 261, 263 (1869)).
46. FED. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note; see also Judson F.
Falknor, Extrinsic Policies Affecting Admissibility, 10 RUTGERS L.REV. 574,
590 (1956); VAUGHN C. BALL, ET AL., MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE 666 (Edward W. Cleary ed., West Publishing Co. 2d ed. 1972).
47. The Repair Rule, supra note 20, at 227-28.
48. FED. R. EVID. 403 (Rule 403, entitled Exclusion of Relevant Evidence
on Grounds of Prejudice, Confusion, or Waste of Time, reads: "Although
relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.").
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such circumstances is properly left to the trier of fact. 49 However,
it is notable that no studies have been conducted that support the
policy proposition that parties would be deterred from taking
remedial actions in the absence of an evidentiary rule barring
inclusion.50 As one commenter noted, "Throughout the rather
long and tortuous history of the rule excluding repairs, no court or
49. See 23 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5282 (1980) The rule is of relatively recent origin.
It was not until 1869 that English courts first held that evidence that after
an accident an alleged tortfeasor had taken steps to prevent its recurrence
could not be used as proof that his prior conduct had been negligent.
Although a few American courts initially resisted the doctrine, it was
eventually accepted in every state except Kansas and South Dakota. The rule
was, however, quite narrowly construed; if the offeror could plausibly claim
that the evidence was relevant to prove some fact other than negligence, most
courts, applying the doctrine of multiple admissibility, held that the evidence
could be admitted for the other purpose, subject to a limiting instruction that
forbade the jury to use it as evidence of negligence.
The admissibility of evidence of subsequent repairs for these other
purposes soon hardened into a set of exceptions to the general rule that
threatened to erode it completely. It has been said that it is rare that the
rule operates to exclude evidence and one writer has suggested that the
exceptions show that courts seriously doubt the wisdom of the general rule.
In this respect, the doctrine of subsequent repairs resembles the rule
excluding evidence of prior crimes; indeed, it has sometimes been suggested
that the two are alike in that both are rules that in reality admit the evidence
they purport to exclude except when offered for a single, narrow purpose - in
the case of the subsequent repair rule, to prove consciousness of fault by the
tortfeasor. The two rules differ, however, in that writers have seldom urged
abandonment of the prior crimes rule, but abolition of the subsequent repairs
doctrine has been repeatedly advocated.
50. Id. Most modern writers and courts prefer the quasi-privilege
rationale, arguing that the best explanation for the rule is not relevance but
the public policy of encouraging people to take precautionary measures after
an accident by assuring them that such steps cannot be used as evidence of
past negligence. However, in view of the devastating criticisms that have
been made of this rationale, it is difficult to see how anyone favoring the
preservation of the rule could regard it as a sound justification. There is only
skimpy evidence that tort defendants behave in the way that this argument
supposes. Many of them are not aware of the rule, and those who were would
surely regard it as a leaky shield in view of the many exceptions that would
admit the evidence. Moreover, the fear of further tort liability or other
sanctions provides a substantial incentive for defendants to make repairs
even if this will increase the likelihood of their being found liable for past
accidents. Finally, in cases where the only probative evidence of negligence is
the taking of subsequent remedial measures, the rule of evidence undermines
the policy of the law of torts by subsidizing the safety of others through a
denial of compensation to the injured plaintiff.
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writer has produced any empirical data showing that the rule has
resulted in a single repair or that its absence would discourage
repair activity. ' 51 In preparing this note, it is apparent that this
long trend of the utter absence of empirical evidence to support
the social policy prong of the subsequent remedial measure
exclusion rule remains glaring.5 2 This dubious and long-standing
assumption is now being openly contested by the counter-
argument, often in product liability suits, which presents the
reality that entities are encouraged to make subsequent
improvements and repairs so as to avoid exposure to continuing
liability. 53  This rationale has added strength to the logical
proposition that in claims originating from circumstances where
an injury has occurred and there has been no remedial measure
taken, the presumption of negligence is heightened not in spite of
'the world being foolish,' but because there is a strong and
reasonable expectation that 'the world gets wiser.' In other words,
because there is sufficient incentive to make repairs following an
accident irrespective of negligence, 54 the 407 evidentiary bar is at
51. Victor E. Schwartz, The Exclusionary Rule on Subsequent Repairs - A
Rule in Need of Repair, 7 FORUM 1, 6 n.31 (1971) where the author expands
this point, writing, "The authors of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence
apparently did not empirically test their conclusion that their rule would
'encourage people to take or at least not discourag[e] them from taking steps
in furtherance of added safety."' (alteration in original).
52. Schwartz, supra note 51 at 6 n.31 ("Courts in Kansas for many years
admitted evidence of subsequent repairs or remedial measures when this
tended to prove ... negligen[ce]. In all these years no defendant marshalled
any evidence that would tend to prove that the rule allowing admissibility
discouraged the making of repairs. The policy of the Kansas courts would
appear to have been that the mere possibility that its rule would have this
unfortunate effect was 'not deemed of equal importance with protection
against life and limb' that could be achieved by admitting the evidence. In
1963 the Kansas legislature adopted the Uniform Rules of Evidence .... [i]t
included an exclusionary rule on evidence of repair. The 0 legislative history
that is available indicates that no evidence was produced showing that the
eighty-year old Kansas rule of admission did not work and work well.").
53. See Ault v. Int'l Harvester Co., 528 P.2d 1148, 1151-52 (Cal. 1974).
54. GRAHAM C. LILLY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, § 5.17,
at 172-73 (2d ed. 1987) ("Whether this rule of exclusion actually affects one's
willingness to undertake remedial steps is problematic and the assumption
that it does has been seriously questioned. Arguably, even if the evidence of
remedial measures were admissible, the actor would still make the necessary
repairs or take other corrective action. Failure to do so poses for him the risk
that another person would injure himself; furthermore, the second claimant's
case would be strengthened by the fact that the defendant had notice of a
20091
310 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW [Vol. 14:298
best a redundant incentive, and at worst a patently false
assumption unsupported by empiricism. 55  What is worse,
whether reality is closest to the best case scenario or the worst
case scenario, or simply something in between, at present, in all
jurisdictions but Rhode Island, "the exclusionary rule serves only
to protect defendants who might otherwise be held liable under
substantive tort principles.... without any corresponding benefit
to society."56
B. Federal 407 and the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A
As foreshadowed previously, the fundamental overhaul to
torts law implicated by Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A was
cited by the Rhode Island Advisory Committee as directly calling
into play the concerns of federal rule 407.57 In large part, § 402A
reflected the thinking embodied in the seminal California
Supreme Court decision in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,
Inc..58 In Greenman, the Court effectuated a movement toward
strict liability that was incorporated into the Restatement
(Second), published in 1965, just two years later.59  Cited
specifically by Rhode Island Advisory Committee, § 402A asserts,
"One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused .. -"60 Rhode Island's
early determination regarding the logical indefensibility of
distinguishing between strict and negligence liability for the
possibly dangerous condition by reason of the first accident.").
55. See Herman L. Trautman, Logical or Legal Relevancy - A Conflict in
Theory, 5 VAND. L. REV. 385, 411-13 (1952) (Advocating a shift to logical
analysis instead of legal precedence, Professor Trautman's influential
comment proposes that the rule of exclusion of subsequent repairs loses
whatever semblance of rationality it might sustain because it is eroded by the
numerous exceptions it has historically contained. In addition to the
declaration that the subsequent measures bar and its exceptions results in
inefficient trial administration due to the absence of a usable principle,
Professor Trautman concludes, "this results in the exclusion of circumstantial
evidence without reason or explanation.").
56. Schwartz, supra note 51, at 7.
57. R.I. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note.
58. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963).
59. JOHN L. DIAMOND, LAWRENCE C. LEVINE & M. STUART MADDEN,
UNDERSTANDING TORTS 272 (3d ed. 2007).
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965); see also R.I. R. EVID.
407 advisory committee's note.
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purposes of determining the admissibility of subsequent remedial
measure evidence is as admirable from a contemporary
perspective as it was perceptive at the time of the pronouncement.
In part, this is because the same arguments used to support the
position that evidence of remedial measures would be barred for
negligence claims but not for strict liability claims have been used
to support the Rhode Island position that it is logically
indefensible to treat remedial measure evidence differently
dependent upon the nature of the claim. This recognition is
imperative to understanding the nature of what this entire
comment advances, for it is this recognition that resolves the
logical contradiction that is going to become increasingly apparent
as Restatement (Third) of Torts intersects with federal rule 407.
It is also imperative because without this first distinction, which
has in large part proven to be right, Rhode Island could not have
come to the second distinction - the distinction resulting in the
decision that all evidence of subsequent remedial measures is
sufficiently competent and relevant so as to overcome speculative
policy considerations.
Because it is the first of the two major distinctions made by
Rhode Island that have resulted in Rhode Island's significant
status, it is important to analyze the subsequent remedial remedy
tension arising as a result of Greenman and § 402A. Here, the
most important case in the field is Ault v. International Harvester
Co.6 1 In Ault, the plaintiff brought a strict liability claim in
response to injuries caused by a defectively designed motor vehicle
gear box. 62 Appealing a plaintiffs jury verdict, the defendant
argued that the trial court, by allowing evidence of gear box
changes made three years after the plaintiffs accident, had
violated California Evidence Code 1151, which bars evidence of
61. R.I. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note; Ault v. Int'l Harvester
Co., 528 P.2d 1148 (Cal. 1974); see also Joseph A. Hoffman & George D.
Zuckerman, Tort Reform and Rules of Evidence: Saving the Rule Excluding
Evidence of Subsequent Remedial Actions, 22 ToRT & INS. L.J. 497, 505 (1987)
(Recognizing that though Ault is the landmark case regarding the
inapplicability of applying the exclusionary rule in strict liability cases, one of
the first to successfully articulate the theory was Sutkowski v. Universal
Marion Corp., 281 N.E.2d 749 (Ill. App. 1972)).
62. Michael W. Blanton, Comment, Application of Federal Rule of
Evidence 407 in Strict Products Liability Cases: The Evidence Weighs Against
Automatic Exclusion, 65 UMKC L. REV. 49, 61-62 (1996).
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subsequent remedial measures to prove negligent or culpable
conduct. 63 Affirming the lower court, the California Supreme
Court determined that in the products liability context public
policy justifications do not support application of the exclusionary
rule. 64 The Court held:
When the context is transformed from a typical negligence
setting to the modern products liability field, however, the 'public
policy' assumptions justifying this evidentiary rule are no longer
valid. The contemporary corporate mass producer of goods, the
normal products liability defendant, manufactures tens of
thousands of units of goods; it is manifestly unrealistic to suggest
that such a producer will forego making improvements in its
product, and risk innumerable additional lawsuits and the
attendant adverse effect upon its public image, simply because
evidence of adoption of such improvement may be admitted in an
action founded on strict liability for recovery on an injury that
preceded the improvement. In the products liability area, the
exclusionary rule of section 1151 does not affect the primary
conduct of the mass producer of goods, but serves merely as a
shield against potential liability. 65
63. Id. at 62.
64. C. Paul Carver, Esq., Subsequent Remedial Measures 2000 and
Beyond, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 583, 598 (2000).
65. Ault v. Int'l Harvester Co., 528 P.2d 1148, 1151-52 (Cal. 1974)
(emphasis added); see also Ault, 528 P.2d at 1152 n.4 (quoting Note, Products
Liability and Evidence of Subsequent Repairs, 1972 DuKE L.J. 837, 845-852).
In a cogent analysis of the policy considerations underlying the
admission of evidence of post-occurrence changes in a products liability
context, the author states, 'The assumption that the admission of evidence of
subsequent repairs discourages defendants from making required repairs
may be erroneous. Manufacturers and distributors of mass-produced
products may not be so callous to the safety of the consumer as the general
exclusionary rule presumes. Furthermore, to the extent that admission of
such evidence results in recovery by injured plaintiffs, it can be argued that
evidence of subsequent repairs encourages future remedial action. A
distributor of mass-produced goods may have thousands of goods on the
market. If his products are defective, the distributor would probably face
greater total liability by allowing such defective products to remain on the
market or by continuing to put more defective products on the market than
he would by being adjudged liable in one particular case where evidence of
subsequent repairs was introduced. Also, concern on the part of the
distributors for consumer protection is promoted by consumer organizations,
federal agencies, and mass media exposure of product defects. To some
extent, the economic self-interest of product distributors requires that they
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Economic self-interest drives reasonable improvement, not an
unnecessary liability shield derivative of a rule that excludes
"evidence for policy reasons quite apart from enabling the trier of
fact to reach a correct verdict. '66
At least five facets of this self-interest can be identified. 67
First, failure to take remedial action following an accident exposes
either an individual or a corporation to increased risk of liability
due to the impact of a previous accident upon reasonable
foreseeability. 68 Second, individuals and corporations will only
make repairs and remedies with the intention of improving safety
because no entity will undertake a remedial measure solely as
change for change's sake. 69 Third, consumer safety advocates,
watchdog groups, product testing guides, safety reports and
awards, special interest lobbyists and agencies provide incentive
and pressure promoting manufacturers to make repairs and
improve products. 70 Fourth, "the manufacturers' intrinsic concern
with consumer safety mitigates the need for an exclusionary
rule."71  Finally, it is difficult to sell products, and therefore
remain competitive in the marketplace, once knowledge of a
product defect has circulated amongst consumers so as to tarnish
either a particular product or the associated corporate brand. 72
repair and improve defective products to avoid adverse publicity which might
result from future litigation. Since a prior jury finding of product
defectiveness is admissible in a subsequent suit when the product causing
the second injury is substantially similar to the first, distributors of defective
products are under pressure to repair or alter their products to insulate
themselves from a finding of defectiveness which may be used against them
in subsequent litigation.... In conclusion, excluding evidence of subsequent
repairs to encourage future remedial action may preclude recovery under
theories of products liability which are themselves designed to ensure safety
in marketed products. Relevant evidence should not be excluded from a
products liability case by an obsolete evidentiary rule when modern legal
theories, accompanied by economic and political pressures, will achieve the
desired policy goals.'
66. Schwartz, supra note 51, at 3.
67. E. Lee Reichert, Note, The "Superior Authority Exception" to Federal
Rule of Evidence 407: The "Remedial Measure" Required to Clarify a
Confused State of Evidence, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 843, 851-53.
68. Id. at 851-52.
69. Id. at 852.
70. Id. at 853.
71. Id.
72. This fifth facet is a construction of this note's author. Though the
notion of marketplace viability and brand maintenance are tangentially
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While the strict liability evidentiary exception emerged as one
answer to the questions triggered by evolving concepts of tort
liability inherent in § 402A and its embracing case law, 73 this
approach has not been conclusive. 74 However, what is conclusive
is that § 402A, which represented a significant progression in tort
conceptualization, intersected quite problematically with the
subsequent remedial measure rule. 75  At least, pre-1997, it
operated problematically in all places but Maine and Rhode
Island. In Rhode Island, business in relation to Rule 407
continued as usual - consistent and predictable. Determining
early that § 402A emphasized fault, Rhode Island avoided the
pitfall that has become common with federal rule 407 and its
reflections as cast within the various states. 76To wit, "the
acceptance by many courts of strict liability in tort has encouraged
a significant increase in product liability cases, and spawned
another exception to the exclusionary rule, that the rule is
alluded to within the other four facets, the importance of this concept merits
direct articulation and enumeration.
73. See Ritter v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 283 A.2d 255, 263 (R.I. 1971)
(express adoption by the Rhode Island Supreme Court of § 402A and the
incumbent strict liability principles).
74. See Herdon v. Seven Bar Flying Servs., Inc., 716 F.2d 1322, 1333-34
(10th Cir. 1983) (summarizing appendix displays and discusses jurisdictional
and Circuit splits in relation to applying the 407 bar to strict liability claims).
75. The Ault decision has represented a strident minority position; cf.
Brent R. Johnson, The Uncertain Fate of Remedial Evidence: Victim of an
Illogical Imposition of Federal Rule of Evidence 407, 20 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 191, 201 (1994).
Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n was the first [post-Ault]
strict liability case to test Rule 407. In that 1977 case, a farmer sued the
manufacturer of a cattle protein supplement when his calves died after
ingesting the product. After the accident, the manufacturer sent consumers a
notice warning that the feed supplement may be dangerous if used within one
month of transporting and vaccinating cattle. The farmer claimed strict
liability and sought to introduce the letter to demonstrate that the product
was unreasonably dangerous and defective. On appeal, the Eighth Circuit
admitted the evidence on the ground that strict liability, by its nature, does
not contain the elements of negligence required for exclusion under Rule 407.
Despite the apparent lack of ambiguity in the Robbins decision, federal
circuit courts have inconsistently applied Rule 407 to subsequent product
liability actions. The first occasion of inconsistency occurred in 1979, when
the Third Circuit, ruling in Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., 595 F.2d 84 (3d Cir.
1979) decided that Rule 407 does apply to strict liability claims.
76. R.I. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note.
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inapplicable in strict liability cases. ' 77 In each jurisdiction where
strict liability claims, consistent with § 402A have been accepted,
the rule 407 question is inherently implicated such that courts are
placed in the unenviable position of being tasked to get one more
angel onto the head of an already overburdened pin. The results
have been inconsistent interpretations, split circuits, 78  an
invitation to forum shopping due to lack of uniformity, 79 and a
general hodgepodge of confusion.
Striving to address the muddled state of the rule 407 bar
caused by § 402A, Federal Rule 407 was amended in 1997 to
provide that "evidence of the subsequent measures is not
admissible to prove negligence, culpable conduct, a defect in a
product, a defect in a product's design, or a need for a warning or
instruction."80 The proposed 1997 revision prescribed by the
Supreme Court was enacted by Congress without change.8 1
Clearly, in contravention of Ault, and all jurisdictions that
followed the theory advanced in Ault, this change sent the clear
message that the strict liability exception to the subsequent
77. Hoffman & Zuckerman, supra note 61, at 504.
78. Thats L. Richardson, Comment, The Proposed Amendment to Federal
Rule of Evidence 407: A Subsequent Remedial Measure That Does not fix the
Problem, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1453, 1467 (1996) ("In refusing to apply Rule 407
to products liability actions, the Eighth and Tenth Circuits follow the
minority rule. These two circuits adopted the rationale of the California
Supreme Court in Ault v. International Harvester Co.").
79. Erin G Lutkewitte, Comment, A Problem in Need of Repair:
Louisiana's Subsequent Remedial Measures Rule, 67 LA. L. REV. 195, 224-25
(2006) (Though the writer of this comment overlooks Rhode Island in
asserting that "The exclusion of evidence of subsequent remedial measures is
a universally accepted doctrine when applied to negligence and culpable
conduct," useful insights into the forum shopping promoted by lack of
uniformity in response to 407 exclusionary differences are offered therein);
see also Carver, supra note 65, at 593; Johnson, supra note 76, at 204-05
('Most cases involving the application of the exclusionary rule to subsequent
remedial evidence are diversity actions, and thus, arise in federal court. In
such cases, Federal Evidence Rule 407, rather than state law, generally
applies since it can be rationally classified as procedural by nature. However,
where state legislation contains specific exclusionary provisions for
subsequent repairs, the state statutes may apply due to their substantive
nature.").
80. FED. R. EVID. 407 (amended April 11, 1997; effective December 1,
1997) (emphasis added).
81. GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE: FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 2008-2009
STATUTORY SUPPLEMENT 60 (2d ed. 2008).
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measure rule was not the preference of the Supreme Court or
Congress.8 2 Federal Rule 407 applied equally to negligence and
strict liability actions. However, even as this attempt to impart
clarity and uniformity was underway, the ALI, on the heels of the
evidentiary amending, published the Restatement (Third) of
Torts. 83 Specifically, § 2, responding to dissatisfaction with the
state of strict liability in tort, would seek to reduce the role of the
consumer expectation test of § 402A - which defines
"reasonableness" in accordance with an ordinary consumer's
expectation - and fill the resultant vacuum with the
pragmatically-oriented RAD requirement. 84 Though making the
"reasonableness" standard less subject to shifting societal whims,
the RAD requirement also places an increased burden on the
plaintiff, one which quite arguably makes evidence of subsequent
measures not only far more probative and relevant, but far more
imperative for a full and fair adjudication by the trier of fact.85
These two concurrent changes have set Federal Rule 407 and
evolving tort principles on a collision course based upon
coordinates of inherent contradiction. 86
82. See Grubbs, supra note 41, at 782 (noting that, "[a]lthough the
amendment clarified application of the exclusion of subsequent remedial
measures evidence at the federal level, state courts remain divided").
83. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 (1998).
84. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (1965)
(establishing that a product is 'unreasonably dangerous' "to an extent beyond
that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases
it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its
characteristics."); see generally Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc., 573 P.2d
443, 455-456 (Cal. 1978) (holding that a product may be found defective in
design, "if the plaintiff establishes that the product failed to perform as safely
as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or
reasonably foreseeable manner.").
85. Reichert, supra note 67, at 849; infra note 92 and accompanying text.
86. See Grubbs, supra note 41, at 808 (arguing that Kentucky should
repeal its recent 407 amendment, the author concludes, "The amendment
extends application of the rule to products liability actions and results in a
direct conflict with Kentucky's feasible alternative design requirement in
design defect cases. By abandoning what is ultimately a futile revision to
KRE 407, Kentucky will avoid needless appeals to clarify the admissibility of
subsequent remedial measures in products liability cases.").
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C. Federal Rule 407 (1997) and the Restatement (Third) of Torts §
2
Section 2(b) of the Restatement (Third) sets forth the RAD
requirement. 87 It is worth noting at the start: "The controversy
surrounding the Restatement (Third)'s RAD requirement does not
stem from complex language. ' 88 The section states that a design
defect exists, "when the foreseeable risks of harm posed by the
product could have been reduced or avoided by the adoption of a
reasonable alternative design . . . and the omission of the
alternative design renders the product not reasonably safe .... ,,89
Under this language, "[a]ssessment of a product design requires a
comparison between an alternative design and the product design
that caused the injury, undertaken from the viewpoint of the
reasonable person." 90
This shift in focus from consumer expectations to RAD is
seismic in nature.91
First, section 2(b) expressly limits consideration to 'the
foreseeable risks of harm posed by the product.' Second, it
requires establishment of a reasonable alternative design (RAD)
as an element of a design defect claim. To hold a manufacturer
accountable for injuries caused by its defectively designed product,
a plaintiff must find or develop an alternative design, demonstrate
that it was a 'reasonable' (meaning cost effective) alternative at
the time of the manufacturer's decision, and prove that the
87. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 (1998).
88. Richard L. Cupp Jr., Defining the Boundaries of 'Alternative Design"
Under the Restatement (Third) of Torts: The Nature and Role of Substitute
Products in Design Defect Analysis, 63 TENN. L. R. 329, 333 (1996).
89. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2(b) (1998).
90. Cupp, supra note 88, at 334.
91. Victor E. Schwartz, The Restatement, Third, Torts: Products Liability:
A Model of Fairness and Balance, 10 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL. 41, 41-44 (2000)
(the author notes, 'The Restatement Third, Torts: Product Liability is a
model of fairness and balance. It neither favors plaintiffs nor defendants. It
is based on case law written by America's judges. It is not simply a result of
'poll taking' of existing case law. The reasoning, insight and public policy
supporting case law have been the guidelines for the new RESTATEMENT'S
rules." In contrast, of the consumer expectation test, the author asserts, "the
problem with the test is that it is so subjective that it can mean anything to
anyone. Each juror can have his or her own personal 'expectations' which
may result in defendants being subject to too harsh or too lenient a
requirement.").
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manufactured product was not reasonably safe because it did not
incorporate the alternative design.
Third, the Restatement expressly rejects the consumer
expectations test as 'an independent standard for judging the
defectiveness of product designs,' relegating it to 'an important
factor in determining the necessity for, or the adequacy of, a
proposed alternative design.'...
These requirements effectively insulate most product
marketing decisions from tort system review and erect substantial
impediments to review of design choices. The manifest effect (and
apparent purpose) is to shift accident costs to consumers by either
precluding their claims or making them harder to establish....
As to design decisions, the RAD requirement (including its
rejection of hindsight and of the consumer expectations test)
presents 'a potentially insurmountable stumbling block' in the
way of those injured by badly designed products. 92
In fact, the complexity of the landscape is in great part a
function of the relative youth of a robust realm of tort law, a realm
whose rapid development has neatly coincided with the rise of 20th
century mass production, industrialism and the now inevitable
surge of mass economics. 93 Additionally, this shift is seismic
because of the utter incompatibility between this shift in tort
thinking and the absolute hobbling effect of federal rule 407.
The theme is clear, where product liability concepts have
expanded, the role of remedial measure evidence has taken on
widening significance. 94 As such, "[b]ecause of the importance of
Rule 407 in products liability litigation, much of the current
dispute is rooted in the development of that field. 95
92. Note, Just What You'd Expect: Professor Henderson's Redesign of
Products Liability, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2366, 2372-73 (1998) (hereinafter
Products Liability) (The author of this note concludes that Restatement
(Third) is a highly problematic document that "represents a giant step
backward." This conclusion hinges in part on the high burden RAD would
place upon the plaintiff. This note suggests that the Restatement (Third) is
not the problem, but it is Federal Rule 407 that is the problem - for the two
cannot comfortably coexist without imparting an unfair burden upon
plaintiffs.).
93. Vandall, supra note 38, at 1425-26 (studying the economic impact of
the RAD requirement in relation to the added, and ultimately dissuading,
litigation burden of the requirement shift upon plaintiffs).
94. Freeman, supra note 5, at 1186.
95. Id.
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Problematically, substantive review of developments in the
Federal Rules and the Restatements indicates diverging
approaches that spell more than a lack of clarity and finality to
issues that have beleaguered courts for decades. 96 Worse even, it
is here asserted that utilization of the RAD requirement with
federal rule 407 is destined to preclude access to just remedies for
plaintiffs in liability cases.
This tension between the proposed RAD requirement of § 2
and the proposed 1997 change to Federal Rule 407 was
predictable. Even before the respective proposals were published,
criticisms anticipating the incipient contradictions abounded.
97
For, even as federal rule 407 was explicitly expanding the
exclusionary bar to strict liability claims, Restatement (Third) was
advocating the import of subsequent measures while affirming
strict liability claims through "reasonableness" language - a
hallmark of negligence.
[T]he Third Restatement Draft states explicitly that design
defects and defects due to inadequate instructions or warnings are
to be judged by a reasonableness standard at the time of sale or
distribution...
• . . First, if a product causes injury while being put to a
reasonably foreseeable use, the product manufacturer is imputed
with knowledge of the risks attendant to such use. Second, by
characterizing a claim in terms of strict liability rather than in
terms of negligence, courts can limit the introduction of defenses
such as comparative or contributory negligence. Finally, by
96. Id. at 1218. (Here, I challenge the author's conclusion regarding the
effect of the then proposed changes to federal rule 407. In fact, until any
version of rule 407 is synchronized to tort reform as led by the Restatements,
clarity and finality will elude. Rhode Island, through its unique approach,
has either presaged, or simply been fortunate to be positioned for just such
synchronicity between its 407 rule and the trending direction of tort reform).
97. Cami Perkins, The Increasing Acceptance of the Restatement (Third)
Risk Utility Analysis in Design Defect Claimas, 4 NEV. L.J. 609, 614 (2004)
("A final criticism is that the Restatement (Third) is a retrogression in
products liability because it returns to negligence concepts by placing the
burden on the plaintiff. Pro-consumer advocates present this argument
because the Restatement (Second) relieved plaintiffs from proving negligence
on the part of the manufacturer. By focusing on the product itself, however,
the consumer expectations test unfairly made it easier to obtain a recovery
for the plaintiff, regardless of whether the manufacturer exercised the utmost
care.").
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focusing on the product rather than on the conduct of the
manufacturer, courts avoid a negligence standard that may be 'too
forgiving of a small manufacturer who might be excused for its
ignorance of risk or for failing to take adequate precautions to
avoid risk.' Thus, while the theory of strict liability may have
become the 'paramount' basis of liability for product
manufacturers, elements of the traditional negligence theory have
found their way back into the strict liability scheme. 98
Here, it is apparent that the longstanding criticism that strict
liability is a semantically constructed judicial hedge against overly
weak negligence concepts not only remains but resurfaces in
Restatement (Third).99 Identified as 'logically indefensible,' this
judicial hedge is precisely what the Rhode Island Advisory
Committee's Notes refused to validate. 10 0  Interestingly, in
addition to reasonableness, Restatement (Third), by speaking of a
'reasonableness standard' at the time of sale or distribution, was
intensely implicating the bounds of rule 407 such that some
argued that the revised exclusionary rule did not go far enough
and should be expanded to cover pre-event remedial measures
taken after a manufacturer releases its product into the stream of
commerce. 101  Hopefully, what has become clear is that the
miasma surrounding federal rule 407 and its relationship to tort
principles stems from an attempt to validate and advance rules
that, at root, are logically irreconcilable.
98. Richardson, supra note 78, at 1464-66 (emphasis added).
99. Products Liability, supra note 92, at 2380 (assailing one of the
architects of Restatement (Third) and thereby illuminating the rationale of
the Restatement, the note asserts, "[A]ssumption that fault somehow inheres
in the nature of causation is a manifestation of an implicit underlying
assumption that the standard to be applied by a court for imposition of
liability must be the same as the standard of conduct desired on the actor's
part. This underlying assumption may be seen as embodied in Henderson's
conformability constraint: Henderson argues that it is both inefficient and
unfair 'to penalize an individual for failing to conform to... a rule that asks
the impossible."') (alterations in original).
100. See generally R.I. R. EVID. 407 advisory committee's note.
101. Richardson, supra note 78, at 1456 ("while the rule's expansion to
cover products liability actions is appropriate, limiting the scope of the
exclusionary rule to remedial measures taken after personal injury or
property damage in products liability actions is inconsistent with both the
public policy behind the rule and substantive products liability law.").
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D. Rhode Island Law in Relation to the Restatements (Second) &
(Third)
To further contextualize Rhode Island's instructive
positioning at a nexus of tort and evidentiary law, it is useful to
define the state's current relationship to Restatements (Second)
and (Third). The Rhode Island Supreme Court explicitly adopted
Restatement (Third) of Torts . 5 in Buonanno v. Colmar Belting
Co., Inc..10 2 In dicta, the court spoke favorably of Restatement
(Third) of Torts § 2, and specifically . 2(b), which sets forth the
RAD standard. 103 Whether Buonanno evinces adoption of
Restatement (Third) of Torts . 2 is debatable. 104 Since Buonanno,
the court has not expounded upon this discussion of § 2.105
However, the following cases provide some modicum of support for
the position that the Rhode Island Supreme Court may be willing
to expressly adopt Restatement (Third) § 2, and therefore the
ascendance of the traditional risk-utility test that flows into a
RAD analysis, if eiven the oDDortunitv. 106
The first is Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc.10 7 In
Castrignano, the court cited the seminal 1971 Ritter v.
Narragansett Electric Co. 108 case, in which the court embraced the
strict liability consumer-expectation test advanced under
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402(A). Post-Ritter, the court has
adopted several of the Restatement (Second)'s comments that
explain how § 402(A) should be applied. 109 These comments often
102. Buonanno v. Colmar Belting Co., Inc., 733 A.2d 712, 716 (R.I. 1999).
103. Id. at 717-18.
104. See Guilbeault v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 84 F. Supp. 2d 263, 278
(D.R.I. 2000) (rejecting the idea that Rhode Island adopted Restatement
(Third) § 2 in Buonanno).
105. See Ruzzo v. LaRose Enters., 748 A.2d 261, 266 n.6 (R.I. 2000)
(discussing the court's adoption of § 5 of Restatement (Third) of Torts in
Buonannol.
106. The language of "risk-utility" balancing is equivalent to the common
tort concept of "cost-benefit" analysis. RAD relies upon such balancing
analyses in a way that the Consumer Expectation Test promoted through the
Restatement (Second) of Torts does not.
107. Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 546 A.2d 775 (R.I. 1988).
108. Id. at 779 (citing Ritter v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 283 A.2d 255 (R.I.
1971)).
109. See Thomas v. Amway Corp., 488 A.2d 716, 722 (R.I. 1985) (citing
comment j); Brimbau v. Ausdale Equip. Rental Corp., 440 A.2d 1292, 1297
(R.I. 1982) (citing comment f); Romano v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 336 A.2d
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have the effect of blunting strict liability concepts. In
Castrignano, the court adopted § 402(A) comment k, stating,
"[c]omment k recognizes that certain products have dangers
associated with their use even though they are manufactured and
used as intended. It provides that those products that are deemed
'unavoidably unsafe' should be exempted from the no-fault strict-
liability analysis of § 402A."11°The court goes on to state,
"[h]aving adopted comment k, we must next decide the scope of its
protection by defining what drugs comment k should exempt from
design-defect liability."111 While section k and Castrignano share
a focus upon the field of pharmaceutical drugs, there is nothing in
§ 402A comment k to indicate that the "unavoidably unsafe"
concept and the risk-utility analysis it triggers is limited to that
sector. Most significant is that in adopting the comment k
exception, the court signaled that it will emphasize the social
policies underlying risk-utility. To this point, the court, quoting
comment k, held:
'The seller of such products, again with the qualification
that they are properly prepared and marketed, and
proper warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is
not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate
consequences attending their use, merely because he has
undertaken to supply the public with an apparently
useful and desirable product, attended with a known but
apparently reasonable risk.' This comment provides a
risk-benefit test for products that, given the present state
of human knowledge, are incapable of being made safe for
their intended use. 112
While Castrignano pre-dates the Restatement (Third), it does
evidence that the Rhode Island Supreme Court may prefer
negligence concepts to strict liability concepts where there are
social interests in recognizing the practical necessity, be it current
or retroactive, of risk-utility balancing. That sets the stage for
ultimately adopting the RAD test promoted in the Restatement
(Third).
555, 558 (1975) (citing comment m).
110. Castrignano, 546 A.2d at 797.
111. Id. at 780-81
112. Id. at 780.
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Castrionano imDliedly affirms the court's adoption of . 402(A),
comment j, in Thomas.1 1 3 Departing from rigorous strict liability
concepts, comment i establishes that the standard for failure to
warn is equivalent to the standard for negligence. 114 "In Thomas.
• . th[e] court limited the failure-to-warn theory by ruling that a
seller need only warn of those dangers that are reasonably
foreseeable and knowable at the time of marketing." 115 Again, the
core concept is that prior to the publication of the Restatement
(Third), the court demonstrated a history of easing away from
strict liability theories in favor of negligence analyses founded
upon risk-utility test public policy arguments. Such a history
accords with Rhode Island's subsequent measure evidentiary
policy, and presents a harmonized framework of tort and
evidentiary rules that other jurisdictions are flailing to either
attain or reconcile.
Considering Buonanno as the logical progeny of Castrignano
and Thomas, ground exists to support the proposition that the
Rhode Island Supreme Court would expressly adopt the risk-
utility balancing and RAD tests of Restatement (Third) § 2 if given
the opportunity. Common concerns that Restatement (Third) § 2
sets too great a burden upon plaintiffs is addressed, in part,
through reference to § 2 comment b. Comment b emphasizes that
in some instances the plaintiff may establish a design defect
without proof of a reasonable alternative design. These instances
are specifically covered in § 2, Comment e, and §§ 3 and 4. "When
§ 2(b) is read in conjunction with these other provisions that allow
other avenues for determining defective design, it reflects a
substantial body of case law suggesting that the reasonable
alternative design is the predominant, yet not exclusive, method
for establishing defective design."116  The plain purpose of
comment b is to provide the important assurance that adoption of
Restatement (Third) § 2 does not create an absolute and
113. oId. at 779; compare with Raimbeault et al. v. Takeuchi Mfg., 772 A.2d
1056, 1063 (R.I. 2001) (here, citing with favor to Thomas v. Amway Corp. in a
product liability and negligence action predicated on negligent design and
failure to warn theories, the court implicitly utilized the § 402A, comment k,
unavoidably unsafe analysis. As asserted previously, such an analysis
implies a de facto risk-utility test).
114. Thomas, 488 A.2d at 722.
115. Castrignano, 546 A.2d at 782.
116. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OR TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. b (1998).
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overwhelming burden upon plaintiffs to demonstrate a RAD. This
caveat provides consumer-plaintiffs with safeguards while
simultaneously permitting courts to move away from the inherent
pitfalls of the consumer expectations test that has contributed to
much modern disenchantment with the uncertain and
unpredictable state of tort law. 117
PART III - CONCLUSION AND MODEST PROPOSAL
Subsequent remedial measures should be treated uniformly
irrespective of the nature of the claim. Federal 407 has come to
this consistent treatment conclusion as Rhode Island did years
earlier. That the federal rule and Rhode Island differ on the next
logical question, general admissibility, is perhaps the larger point.
Though Rhode Island would appear to be in a super-minority, it
may well be that Rhode Island's position is the stronger both in
terms of principle and policy. The principle is adherence to logic;
the policy is the aim of judicial truth-seeking, especially within
the intensely contested realm of product liability where even small
grains of evidence can have a profound influence on an outcome.
There is something to be said for not chasing the trends of
favor, especially where there is a principled reason for standing
still. Kansas adopted the federal rule on remedial measures
mainly for the aim of uniformity despite a long and untroubled
history of admitting such evidence. 118 Maine's reversal was also
predicated upon blind uniformity aims rather than the
articulation of a logical principle. 119
Whether Rhode Island proves to be a curiosity or a significant
symbol demonstrating the way forward through an inevitable
117. It is worth noting that although the Rhode Island Supreme Court has
adopted sections of the Third Restatement (See Calise v. Hidden Valley
Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 773 A.2d 834, 845 (R.I. 2001) (citing favorably to § C21);
Ruzzo v. LaRose Enter., 748 A.2d 261, 266 n.6 (adopting § 18)), the closest
the Court has come to § 2 is in Buonanno while adopting § 5. This is
significant because it is an adoption of any of §§ 1-4 that will signal the
clearest adoption of the Restatement (Third) product liability approach.
Comment b states, 'This Restatement, especially its first four sections, must
be read together, as an integrated whole." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PROD. LIAB. § 2 (1998).
118. See supra notes 49, 52 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 25-26 (this statement is derived via deductive
reasoning as Maine issued no advisory note explaining the reasons for
reversing its subsequent remedial measure evidentiary rule).
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crisis for federal rule 407 remains to be seen. Rhode Island has,
however, attained what the federal counterpart has striven but
failed to attain - clarity and predictability. In the final analysis,
much of the problem in this field has resulted from submission to
a complex calculus of moving parts where simple Boolean logic
would be far more apropos. In any truth-seeking enterprise,
which is at least in popular thought the prime function of the
judicial system, exclusions of factual evidence should be utilized
not as a first but as a last resort. 120 Federal rule 407 is an
exclusion that has become fraught with exceptions. 12 1 Useful
application of the rule is challenging enough, but the calculus gets
utterly subjective once intersected with the tenuous and
semantically slippery realms of negligence and strict liability in
torts, especially in its burgeoning form as a way for determining
recovery for products liability. The more exclusions and
exceptions that are created, the further from the truth the trier of
fact will be. 122 The contradictory result is logically indefensible:
strict liability will cause liability to reside with non-negligent
parties, while in concurrent cases, the rule 407 exclusion will
shield negligent parties from being held accountable.
For decades now, the criticism of the remedial measure bar is
that if the public policy rational of encouraging, or at least not
discouraging, repairs is an incorrect assumption, then the rule
limits evidence while providing zero social benefit. 123 The point
here asserted is that throughout all of these decades of devotion to
this assumption, there remains no validating empirical proof. 124
The policy of not discouraging repairs thus resembles, more and
120. See FED. R. EVID. 102 (which states, "These rules shall be construed
to secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and
delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the
end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.").
121. See supra note 9 (listing standard enumerated exceptions of FED. R.
EVID. 407).
122. See supra notes 86-94 and accompanying text.
123. Schwartz, supra note 51, at 4-6.
124. Johnson, supra note 75, at 206 ('Those who advocate excluding
remedial evidence argue that admission of the evidence would discourage
otherwise reasonable people from taking steps to increase safety. This
argument, based on early common law decisions involving negligence, is
speculative at best. There is no evidence that admitting remedial evidence
deters manufacturers from correcting products that are known to be defective
or dangerous.").
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more, antiquated speculation. 12 5
Now, particularly in light of evolution in the fields of mass,
economic-driven industrialization and tort, such threadbare
speculation needs to be challenged, and in the absence of
empirical evidence, the truth-seeking enterprise should be
honored above speculative, if not outright specious, social
policies. 12 6 And so, this author concludes with a modest proposal.
Rhode Island should maintain its unchanged course as the sole
jurisdiction allowing subsequent remedial measure evidence
under all circumstances. While it may seem that such a
conclusion renders the entirety of this comment superfluous, it is
here argued that the grounds for Rhode Island's unique position
have been and are worthy of articulation for two main reasons: 1)
to present a ready defense against some future impulse to follow
the national trend simply because it is the trend, and 2) more
importantly, to set forth the underlying logic of Rhode Island's
idiosyncratic position such that others might see that the oft-
125. Id. at 206-07 ("Lack of evidentiary support is but one of several flaws
in the deterrence theory. The notion that admitting remedial evidence will
discourage post-accident repairs assumes that manufacturers know and
understand the effect and applicability of Rule 407. This assumption is both
unsupported and unrealistic. Decisions affecting the manufacturing process
are made by management and engineering specialists. It is unlikely that a
concept so foreign to the production process as a federal evidentiary rule
would have any impact on the methods and specifications by which a product
is manufactured. Even assuming that the manufacturer contemplates Rule
407, the effect of the rule, with its many exceptions and inconsistencies, is
incapable of being predicted with any certainty.").
126. The note writer is here reminded of a rather famous parable about a
holiday ham. One holiday, with a large family gathered, the centerpiece ham
was brought into the dining room amid much joy and fanfare. A young child
noticed that both ends of the ham had been cut off to make the ham much
shorter than it would otherwise have been. Curious, the child asked her
father, who had cooked the ham, why the ends had been cut off. The father
answered that he did it this way because that's the way his mother had
always done it. As the father's mother was present, the little girl asked her
fraternal grandmother why she had cut the ends off the ham. She scrolled
her eyes in bemusement before admitting she didn't know the exact reason
but that's what her mother had always done. Well, since the relevant great-
grandmother was present, sitting quietly at the end of the table, the little girl
asked her why she had cut the ends off the ham. The great-grandmother
laughed softly while shaking her head before answering in something of a
rasping whisper, 'My dear child, I cut off the ends of the ham because we
were poor and we had only one pan for cooking. Cutting off the ends was the
only way I could get a ham into the pan."
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ignored or overlooked Rhode Island exception may serve as an
empirical proof of the general failure of the convolute federal
approach. Why? Quite simply because it is a course that is and
has been grounded in the first and simplest of logical principles,
the one we keep coming back and back to - truth. 127
Brian Fielding*
127. Supra at note 1.
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